Alleviating Social Disadvantages of Rapid Economic Growth: A Case for Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) Application in Old Siam by Kostioukova, Anastasia
Claremont Colleges
Scholarship @ Claremont
CMC Senior Theses CMC Student Scholarship
2011
Alleviating Social Disadvantages of Rapid
Economic Growth: A Case for Conditional Cash
Transfer (CCT) Application in Old Siam
Anastasia Kostioukova
Claremont McKenna College
This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you by Scholarship@Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in this collection by an authorized
administrator. For more information, please contact scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kostioukova, Anastasia, "Alleviating Social Disadvantages of Rapid Economic Growth: A Case for Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT)
Application in Old Siam" (2011). CMC Senior Theses. Paper 148.
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/148
  
CLAREMONT McKENNA COLLEGE 
 
 
ALLEVIATING SOCIAL DISADVANTAGES OF RAPID ECONOMIC 
GROWTH: A CASE FOR CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER (CCT) 
APPLICATION IN OLD SIAM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUBMITTED TO 
 
PROFESSOR WILLIAM ASCHER 
 
AND 
 
DEAN GREGORY HESS 
 
BY 
 
ANASTASIA KOSTIOUKOVA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FOR 
 
SENIOR THESIS 
 
2010–2011 
APRIL 25, 2011 
  
  
Acknowledgments  
 Foremost, I would like to thank Professor William Ascher for working with me. 
Due to his guidance, patience, and trust is was able to conduct two-weeks of primary 
research in Thailand. This experience added significant insight to the writing of my 
thesis. I would also like to thank the Center for International Education Exchange study 
abroad staff as well as Khon Kaen University. Their hard work and cooperation was an 
essential part of my field research in Khon Kaen. Additionally, I would like to 
acknowledge the International Crisis Group in Bangkok for working with me. Last but 
not least, I thank all economists at the Asian Development Bank and World Bank 
Bangkok offices for their interviews and follow-up correspondence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table of Contents 
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1 
External and Internal Shocks .............................................................................................. 6 
 Economic Overview ....................................................................................................... 6 
 Political Overview .......................................................................................................... 7 
 Political Overview: Long Live the King ...................................................................... 10 
Livelihood under Threat ................................................................................................... 13 
    Informal Sector Work ................................................................................................... 13 
    Agricultural Society ...................................................................................................... 13 
    Manufacturing ............................................................................................................... 15 
    Tourism ......................................................................................................................... 16 
    Consequences of Civil Unrest ....................................................................................... 17 
The Sources of Thailand’s Inequality and Poverty ........................................................... 18 
    Political Inequality ........................................................................................................ 18 
    Rapid Growth and Increases in Inequality .................................................................... 20 
    Rises in Existing Income Disparities ............................................................................ 23 
    Perceived Inequality...................................................................................................... 24 
    What Lies Ahead........................................................................................................... 26 
Window of Opportunity: Current Advantages of Implementing Cash Transfers ............. 27 
    Social Welfare Aids Future Economic Growth ............................................................ 27 
    Using the Reform Wave as an Advantage ........................................................................... 29 
    Resolving Current Social Welfare Flaws ...................................................................... 32 
    Stopping the Deterioration in Child Development ....................................................... 33 
    CCTs as Buffers to Economic Volatility ............................................................................. 34 
    Gender Equality and CCT Mechanisms ....................................................................... 35 
    Applying Lessons from Past CCT Programs ................................................................ 36 
    Benefits of Creating CCTs in Middle-Income Nations ................................................ 37 
Potential Obstacles and Strategic Solutions............................................................................. 38 
Quality and Distribution of Social Services: Strengthening Desirable Outcomes ........ 38 
  
Quality and Distribution of Social Services: A Need for Improvement .......................... 39 
Quality and Distribution of Social Services: Recommendations ...................................... 41 
The Present State of Social Service Funding: Taking Care of Tax Payers ................... 44 
The Present State of Social Service Funding: A Need for Efficiency .......................... 45 
The Present State of Social Service Funding: Recommendations ................................ 47 
Pilot Programs ................................................................................................................... 50 
Crucial First Steps to Reconciliation .................................................................................... 50 
Design with Foresight ................................................................................................... 52 
Strategic Locations .................................................................................................................. 52 
Mechanisms ................................................................................................................... 53 
Determining Financial Commitments ........................................................................... 57 
Calculations .................................................................................................................................. 58 
Conclusion: Holistic Solutions for Thailand..................................................................... 60 
Appendices ........................................................................................................................ 63 
Alphabetical List of Cited Sources ................................................................................... 91
1 
 
Alleviating Social Disadvantages of Rapid Economic Growth: A Case for 
Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) Application in Old Siam  
Introduction 
 
In Bangkok on May 19th, 2010, a military crackdown ended a two-month-long 
conflict that escalated into the worst political violence Thailand has seen in the last three 
decades. The final week of street fighting left approximately 91 people dead and 1,400 
severely injured.1 In retaliation to the violent dissolution of the protest camps by the Thai 
government, red shirt sympathizers retaliated with hostile demonstrations throughout the 
country’s other cities, such as Khon Kaen.2
Nearly a year later, the general public finds the severity of the conflict especially 
puzzling. Although weekend demonstrations have been a common occurrence in modern 
Thailand, the spring 2010 protest lasted for weeks. This anomaly sparked controversy 
over the protest’s nature; since red shirts, who are mostly poor, cannot afford to remain 
idle for more than a couple days at a time.  
 
Lingering uncertainty contributes to the overall state of discomfort of the nation. 
The extent to which former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, a millionaire 
fugitive in exile, manipulated civilians and funded the unraveling of the drama is widely 
speculated, yet still unknown. Many observers argue that the conflict was initiated by 
Thaksin, but quickly grew beyond his scope and influence to reflect the hardship and 
injustice the majority of the population faces.   
                                                          
1 Robert Horn, "A Year After Protests, Thai Elections Set," Time Magazine, March 12, 2011.  
2 Red shirts are associated with the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD) and are supporters of 
former Prime Minister Thaksin. Yellow shirts are associated with the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) and are 
supporters of the current Prime Minister Abhisit as well as advocates for the Thai monarchy.  
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In support of this theory was the reluctance of the red shirts to accept an early 
reelection bid offered by current Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, a week before the 
eventual crackdown. Accepting this offer would have been in Thaksin’s favor since in all 
likelihood it would have led to the election of a prime minister with red shirt sympathies. 
Further, it would put an end to a conflict which placed many of Thaksin’s business 
interests and investments at risk—some of which he retained despite his exile from 
Thailand.3
In the aftermath, Bangkok remained under a state of emergency for ten months. 
Most alarming is that the official report into who was responsible for the protest’s violent 
turn, has been inconclusive, and tainted by allegations of military non-cooperation and 
interference.
 In reality, no peace deal was signed because the red shirts lacked a unified 
voice—demands and opinions were erratic and fractured within. Furthermore, the 
prevalence of sheer chaos was symbolic of an unorganized mass movement; rather than 
the brilliant ploy of a political mastermind.  
4,5
At present, an uneasy peace reigns over the “Land of Smiles.” Thailand is deeply 
divided as strong disagreements between, and within, parties persist. Unfortunately, 
Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva’s five-point reconciliation plan [see Appendix 1]—
encompassing much needed economic, social, and political reforms—has so far failed to 
provide measures that satisfy all parties.
 
6  In March 2011, the prime minister announced 
to dissolve parliament in May, paving the way for a national elections that June.7
                                                          
3 Pokpong Lawansiri, interviewed with author: Bangkok, Thailand, January 6, 2011.  
   
4 Michael Perry and Ploy Ten Kate. “Thai PM Committed to Reconciliation but No Poll Offer," Reuters, May 21, 2010.  
5 Horn, "A Year After Protests, Thai Elections Set." 
6 Horn, "A Year After Protests, Thai Elections Set." 
7 Ibid. 
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In light of the anticipated elections, Thais remain as uncertain about the future as 
ever. A yellow shirt backed victory for the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) 
would in all likelihood spark accusations of election rigging; potentially provoking a fiery 
reprise of last spring’s conflict.8 While a win for the red shirt supported Puea Thai party 
may set off yet another political intervention by the military.9
Clearly, dramatic actions are needed to bridge the gap between the red shirts and 
the yellow shirts.  As this thesis argues, the fundamental issue is economic: the disparities 
between rich and poor; between the urban central region and the rural northern and 
southern regions.  The reconciliation plan must feature a serious redistribution.  The most 
visible and direct way to do this is through a large-scale conditional cash transfer (CCT) 
program, which would have the crucial added virtue of enhancing the human capital in 
the impoverished regions, permitting the industrial decentralization that Thai 
governments have long promised but have not accomplished. 
 Most ominous is that in all 
likelihood a national election will not bring about reconciliation, it may in fact delay it.  
 In essence, the main source of social discontent was the perception of regional 
inequality produced by past rapid economic growth. This thesis seeks to understand the 
overall consequences of unequal economic development in Thailand, as the rationale for 
asserting that a conditional cash transfer (CCT) program is an appropriate policy tool for 
the reconciliation effort.10
Although CCTs are specifically tailored to nations’ needs; all CCTs serve two 
general economic objectives. First, they seek to provide low-income households with a 
   
                                                          
8 Ibid. 
9 Currently, Puea Thai is the red shirt supported party. In recent years, the Thai parliament has dissolved several red 
shirt parties, including Thai Rak Thai and the Democracy against Dictatorship. However, from a practical standpoint 
these parties are one and the same.         
10 “Thailand's Riots: A Polity Imploding,” The Economist, March 18, 2010. 
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minimum consumption floor. Second, in making transfers conditional, CCTs create 
channels of opportunity and encourage socioeconomic mobility.  Clearly, a successful 
CCT program can also serve the political objective of reducing the resentment arising out 
of inequality and the perception that low-income families and areas are neglected by the 
government. 
This focused form of human capital investment seeks to stop the vicious cycle 
responsible for poverty transmission across generations.11
Following the initial success of these programs during the mid-1990s in Latin 
America, CCTs are currently incorporated in welfare programs of over 30 countries.
 Specifically, money is allotted 
to impoverished households to supplement family income. Although programs vary 
widely, most CCTs address practices surrounding education, health, and nutrition. 
Chiefly these programs motivate households to foster human capital in their children by 
paying families to augment household habit; thereby making them consistent to that 
which is optimal for greater society e.g., requiring children attend school regularly. As 
opposed to more traditional models of providing goods and services to impoverished 
families, CCTs make welfare assistance conditional upon beneficiaries’ actions. The shift 
in demand-side responsibility effectively rebalances accountability between recipients, 
service providers, and governments. 
12
                                                          
11 Ariel Fiszbein and others. Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty (Washington D.C.: 
World Bank, 2009), 1. 
 So 
far the aggregate results have been impressive. For example, between 2003 and 2009, 
Brazil experienced impressive drops in rates of inequality as well as poverty. During this 
12Safety Nets and Transfers, “Conditional Cash Transfers,” The World Bank, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALPROTECTION/EXTSAFETYNETSANDTR
ANSFERS/0,,contentMDK:20615138~menuPK:282766~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:282761,00.html. 
(accessed September 5, 2010). 
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time, the income of poor Brazilians increased seven times as quickly as the income 
among the rich; while poverty fell from 22 percent of the population to 7 percent.13
Surprisingly, Thailand remains barren of CCTs; but the nation would reap huge 
benefits through using such social welfare mechanisms in its ongoing reconciliation 
efforts. In the short-term, Thai CCT programs could alleviate political conflict as well as 
immediate poverty, while stabilizing citizen welfare in times of economic volatility. 
Additionally, such programs would facilitate other policy reforms. In long-term, these 
social safety nets can propel Thailand’s economy through a more educated and 
productive workforce, while also reducing levels of inequality by facilitating trans-
generational socioeconomic movement.  
  
As anger still saturates the nation, CCT programs can be vital components in 
ameliorating the country’s discontent. These programs hold great potential for building 
channels of opportunity for Thailand’s rural poor. Without an appropriate response such 
as this, Thai society will no longer able to compromise as it once did. The most recent 
unrest polarized opinions within families, workplaces, and communities to a previously 
unforeseen extent.14
 
 Turmoil will continue unless a sufficiently strong poverty-alleviation 
response, such as a CCT program, becomes part of the next government’s reconciliation 
platform.  
 
 
                                                          
13 Tina Rosenberg, "To Beat Back Poverty, Pay the Poor,” New York Times, January 3, 2011.  
14 "Thailand's Riots: A Polity Imploding.”  
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External and Internal Shocks: Impacts of Thailand’s Economic and Political Climate 
on Citizen Well-being in the Past and Present 
At the beginning of the 20th Century, Thailand was considered one of the world’s 
poorest nations. Over the past 50 years, it became a triumphant example of sustained 
economic growth. Surpassing other low- and middle-income economies at the time, its 
average annual growth hovered at over 7 percent.
Economic Overview 
15 In fact, between 1987 and 1990, 
Thailand’s economy was the fastest growing in the world—averaging above 9.5 percent 
annually.16
Thailand’s prosperity continued until the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, which 
severely destabilized the Thai baht as well as other regional currencies. Prior to the crisis, 
high interest rates attracted foreign investors to Thailand and neighboring countries. 
Rapidly growing Asian “miracle” economies promised high rates of return. 
Unfortunately, development money was not well monitored and projects did not produce 
sufficient profit. In addition, Thailand’s banking sector was unable to manage massive 
foreign cash flow; this contributed to the accumulation of foreign debt as the amount of 
nonperforming assets grew. Facing bankruptcy due to an overextension in development 
and investment efforts, the government was forced to cut the Thai baht from its fixed 
exchange rate with the U.S. dollar. As a result, Thailand’s economy contracted by 10 
 This impressive performance granted the country membership to the 
exclusive club of rapidly growing newly industrialized economies i.e., Asian tigers.  
                                                          
15  Issara Somchai and Gwi-Yeop Son. Human Security, Today and Tomorrow: Thailand Human Development Report 
2009 (Bangkok: United Nations Development Programme, 2010), 8. 
16 Data,“GDP Growth (annual%),"The World Bank, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?page=4 (accessed April 1, 2011). 
7 
 
percent, exposing the harsh realities of its established development strategy.17
Remarkable growth as well as peril accompanies a nation as highly integrated into 
the global economy as Thailand is. In essence, its economy runs on a single engine: 
external demand.
 
Subsequently, the boom and bust compromised the government’s capacity to address 
poverty. The economy collapsed and the subsequent reduction in tax revenues followed. 
18
In recent years, the world has been going through a series of economic shocks; 
starting from rapidly rising food and fuel prices in 2007, and continuing into the brutal 
global recession the following year. Thailand is unfortunately among the economies that 
are considerably affected by economic abnormalities. External shocks have a profound 
effect on human welfare in Thailand. For example, the Asian Financial Crises increased 
poverty incidence from 11.8 percent in 1996 to 14.2 percent by 2000.
 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has been strongly influenced by 
performance of sectors linked to external demand [Appendix 2].  
19
 As many Thais struggle to maintain a decent livelihood during the recession, 
powerful forces antagonize the welfare of the disadvantaged. In the absence of 
comprehensive social safety nets, the future of Thailand’s poor looks grim.  
  
A decade ago, Thailand seemed among the more politically secure Southeast 
Asian nations. Indeed it had a functioning parliament, growing civil society, active and 
relatively free media as well as an ongoing trajectory of reform.  
Political Overview 
                                                          
17“GDP Growth (annual%),” World Bank Data 
18 Frederico G. Sander and others, Thailand: Economic Monitor June 2010 (Bangkok: World Bank, 2010), 1. 
19 “Thailand’s Official Poverty Lines,” National Economic and Social Development Board, 
http://www.nscb.gov.ph/poverty/conference/papers/7_Thai%20official%20poverty.pdf (accessed March 26, 2011).  
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In 2001, Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party was elected. It was the first time in 
Thai history that a party won a parliamentary majority on its own.20 TRT became the first 
independently elected party to serve a full term. Government reforms promised better 
living conditions for the poor, including improved public services and access to credit.21
The current situation is different. The parliament is predominately made of a 
small fraction of male businessmen, while most other groups are under-represented in 
government.
  
22
Thailand’s political security has plunged dramatically as a result of an 
intensifying conflict begun in 2006. Prime Minister Thaksin was overthrown by the first 
military coup in nearly 14 years. Supporters of the coup have listed corruption, lèse 
majesté, overriding of constitutional checks and balances, and creation of societal 
division as grounds for removing the prime minister from office.
 At present, the government does not serve as a channel for the general 
population to shape public policy. The overall opportunities to partake in politics are 
limited. Corruption, illegitimacy of elections, and malpractice of judiciaries are among 
the greatest concerns Thai people face today.  
23 They felt obligated to 
overthrow Thaksin’s government on the grounds that he and his associates were corrupt, 
and their power was based on the distortion of the political system by money.24
On the other hand, supporters of Thaksin argue that elections a year later installed 
a government not very different in complexion and political tactics from the one 
 Chiefly 
referring to Thaksin’s populist reforms, aimed towards his voter base—Thailand’s poor.   
                                                          
20 "Thailand's King and Its Crisis: A Right Royal Mess," The Economist, December 4, 2008,  
21 Ibid. 
22 Somchai and Son, xi. 
23 Ibid., 52.  
24 Ibid., 59. 
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overthrown, and in fact, the coup itself was unconstitutional. 25
The perception that the Thai political system is presently structured against the 
poor is reinforced by judiciary’s behavior.  Although political corruption in Thailand has 
been a well-documented problem for years, judicial fraud is a new phenomenon.  Until 
recently, the judiciary played a very limited role in politics. However, public distrust has 
been growing since 2006: that year the judiciary nullified a national election and set a 
precedent for future involvement in political affairs. “In the following year, it jailed 
members of the Election Commission, dissolved four parties and banned 220 of their 
executives for five years, froze a former prime minister’s assets, sentenced him to two 
years for abuse of power…sentenced his wife to three years for tax evasion…sacked 
another prime minister for earning petty amounts hosting a television cooking show.”
 Further, they claim that 
the coup was in reality an attempt by the opposition to overthrow a leader who threatened 
the status quo through his populist policies, popular among the lower and middle classes.  
26
However, all judgments are against one former prime minister and his associates. 
Red shirt parties have been legally dissolved several times, yet they come back with new 
resilience and titles. On the other hand, no yellow shirt leaders have gone on trial, even in 
regard to a 2008 protest that culminated in a seizure of Bangkok’s two airports.   
  
The judiciary’s independence is questioned with critics pointing towards 
“retrospective application of new laws…attention to the letter rather than the spirit of the 
law, and failure to apply the same standards to other political figures.”27
                                                          
25 Ibid., 58. 
 While supporters 
26 Ibid., 57.  
27 Ibid.  
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of current practices argue: that past politicians suffered justly because they persistently 
overrode the law as means to achieving political goals. 28
The socio-economic divide in Thai society is unlikely to be mended without 
strong poverty alleviation efforts. Thailand’s modern history has been marked by 
frequent crises; however, this latest phase has created more conflict and insecurity than 
any other in the last 30 years.
  
29 Although fears of an all-out civil war are unjustified, “it 
is reasonable to expect more years of political confrontation and paralysis.”30  
A profound destabilizing force is the unclear future of the monarchy. Few have 
known any king other than Bhumibol. Since his ascendance to the throne in the mid-20th 
century, the institution has been slipping into irrelevance. Throughout Thailand’s modern 
political history, the palace served as a respected power broker during a time when 
“military governments alternated with democratic or semi-democratic regime…all in an 
atmosphere of military coups, attempted coups, threatened coups, and general political 
unrest.”
Political Overview: Long Live the King 
31
Reigning just shy of 65 years, the king has publicly intervened in domestic 
politics only a handful of times, but every time the majesty’s demands were quickly met. 
However, the overall legitimacy of royal power and influence rests on King Bhumibol’s 
charisma and his advisors’ high aptitude. 
  
It is important to note that Thailand’s king is viewed as a demigod and general 
criticism or claims of his secret involvement in politics are considered as punishable 
                                                          
28 Ibid.  
29 Ibid., 7.  
30 "Thailand's succession: As father fades, his children fight.”The Economist, March 18, 2010.  
31 Peter G.Warr and Bhanupong Nidhiprabha, Thailand's Macroeconomic Miracle: Stable Adjustment and Sustained 
Growth (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1996), 1.  
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crimes i.e., lèse majesté. This is a clear limitation to the freedom of speech that Thais are 
guaranteed under both the 1997 and 2007 constitutions.32 Although the king famously 
said in 2005 that he was not above criticism, not many are ready to test this ostensible 
newfound freedom.33
However, many are puzzled over the king’s silence on the recent violence and 
other injustices against red shirts. Red shirts, and foreign observers alike, believe that the 
palace has already taken sides and is no longer an honest broker. 
 Hence, the true extent to which the Thai king has been, and will be, 
involved in politics is not publicly disclosed or openly talked about.  
34
 More damaging are rumors that the American born king has been heavily 
involved in politics for years, utilizing military coups as political instruments.
 This disillusionment 
of the royal family’s universal adoration contributes chaos to Thailand’s political circus.  
35
Unfortunately, the heir apparent to the throne is perhaps the most unpopular 
royal—Prince Vajiralongkorn. Although it would be difficult under any circumstances to 
take the place of a highly beloved and long-reigning king, “Prince Vajiralongkorn is 
already widely loathed and feared.”
 This is 
further cause for concern since King Bhumibol is nearly 83 years old, and the future of 
the nation rests on the next king’s political aptitude. In the absence of a politically savvy 
heir, the nation’s ability to operate in a true democracy will be tested. 
36
                                                          
32 Somchai and Son, 52. 
 Sex and gambling scandals involving the prince are 
widely disseminated and seemingly unscathed by lèse majesté. In addition, foreign 
33 "Thailand's succession: As father fades, his children fight.”  
34 "Thailand's Riots: A Polity Imploding.”  
35 "Thailand's King and Its Crisis: A Right Royal Mess."  
36 "Thailand's succession: As father fades, his children fight.” 
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diplomats describe the next king as unpredictable, eccentric, and completely unsuitable to 
reign.37
Unfortunately, no guarantees exist against an unwise king. Much of the public 
quietly hopes that Princess Sirindhorn will ascend the throne upon her father’s death. 
Although the princess enjoys a saintly image, she is third in line and there is no 
predecessor for a female monarch. The royal crisis no doubt aggravates what is already a 
volatile situation. In an absence of an unbiased and widely-respected mediator, future 
conflicts may escalate to unprecedented levels. 
   
The World Bank political stability index for Thailand dropped steeply from 59.1 
in 1996 to 12.9 in 2008, and is likely to drop lower after the 2010 events are accounted 
for [Appendix 3].38 At present, political unrest is the greatest social concern in Thai 
society. In a 2010 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report on human 
security, discussants were asked to rank the importance of social concerns to the 
population as a whole. Among the six areas of human security covered in this report, the 
discussants’ highest concern was political security. 39 Citizens were worried about 
corruption among politicians, corruption among officials, and overall political disorder.40
The political division is palpable and, at least until May 2010, street protests were 
becoming longer, larger, and more violent. The accumulated frustration over the 
questionable political system is creating a rising propensity towards violence among 
political party patrons; ultimately, transforming Thailand into a less secure nation. 
  
 
                                                          
37 Ibid.  
38 Somchai and Son, 58-9. 
39 Ibid., 5–6.  
40 Ibid., 5–6.  
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Livelihood under Threat 
Thailand’s pattern of externally oriented growth has placed a majority of the 
population in the informal work sector; characterized as part of the economy that is not 
taxed or monitored by an overseeing body.
Informal Sector Work 
41 This results in a flexible labor market likely 
to fall victim to a volatile economic climate. Since rural households are support 
backbones to temporary unemployment, risks are quickly shared and spread throughout 
the nation, especially in low-income families i.e., an urban shock rapidly reaches  the 
rural economy through falling remittance and return migration. Such a phenomenon was 
seen in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, with nearly two million people 
temporarily returning to rural villages.42
Thailand’s flexible labor market leaves the majority of the population highly 
vulnerable. At present, 22–23 million people work in the informal sector and are not 
covered by the social security program i.e., they do not receive benefits associated with 
injury, illness, maternity leave, disability, death, child support, old-age pension, or 
unemployment benefits.
  
43 People are left unprotected; the families are in peril if 
unforeseeable consequences occur.  
The vulnerability of the nation’s poor begins with the volatility of the agricultural 
sector. More of the Thai labor force is employed in the agriculture, forestry, and fishery 
sector than any other sectors; however, their workers earn the smallest hourly wages.  
Agricultural Society 
                                                          
41 Ibid., 10-11.  
42 Ibid. 
43 Chris Baker, Thailand Human Development Report 2007: Sufficiency Economy and Human Development 
(Bangkok: United Nations Development Programme, 2007), 8. 
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The single largest, relatively inelastic, export is rice. Thailand is the world’s leading 
rice exporter, with 55 percent of the nation’s arable land presently under rice 
cultivation.44
Unfortunately, earning income from both agricultural exports and domestic sales is 
increasingly unreliable. Although rice demand is unlikely to fall victim to changing 
consumer tastes or economic downturn, it is threatened by climate change. Erratic 
weather patterns cause cycles of severe droughts and floods; each year their effects are 
becoming more profound. In 2010, a series of dry spells in Thailand caused major crop 
yield loses—reducing output from 5 million tons of rice to 2 million in the August crop 
cycle alone.
 Despite rapid development, it is one of the few nations likely to remain a 
primarily agricultural society. 
45 tapioca Other agricultural exports, such as fish, , cassava, rubber, grain, and 
sugar, as well as processed foods such as canned fruit and frozen shrimp, are also 
affected by climate abnormalities.  
Domestic food supply suffers from an erratic climate also. A mere two months 
after severe droughts affected rice production, flash floods destroyed a large portion of 
farmland, causing a 30% decline in the fresh vegetable harvest.46
As part of a primarily agricultural society, rural Thai people heavily depend on 
nature to subsidize household income. The Mekong River provides a source of irrigation 
as well as fishing for millions of farmers. However, the river is becoming undependable 
 Prices on common food 
items, such as onions and garlic, rose so drastically that locals re-labeled these as 
"luxury" market items.  
                                                          
44 Sophie Clayton, "IRRI in Thailand," International Rice Research Institute, 
http://beta.irri.org/news/images/stories/ricetoday/9-2/IRRI_in_Thailand.pdf (accessed January 7, 2011). 
45 "Drought, floods threaten Thailand’s rice harvest,” Taipei Times, June 10, 2010.  
46 "From drought to floods and another food shortage,” Bangkok Post, November 11, 2010.  
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due to extreme weather patterns. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) identified the Mekong delta as one of the three areas on the planet most 
vulnerable to the impact of climate change; including rises in sea levels, saline intrusions, 
and storms that destroy coastlines and ecosystems.47
Upstream hydropower projects also play a significant role in the Mekong’s 
struggle. Energy generators and irrigation systems have negatively impacted livelihood 
along the river since the early 1990s. Cycles of drought and floods have become more 
severe and unpredictable, increasing the likelihood of crop failure among farmers who do 
not directly benefit from irrigation canals. 
   
 The development projects have also lead to declines in native fish populations. 
Changes in the river’s hydrology negatively affect fish feeding, spawning, and nursing 
grounds; with previous regional hydropower projects causing 30 to 90 percent declines in 
fish catches.48 Additional development on the Mekong and its tributaries may 
permanently damage native fish populations. This would cripple Thailand’s fishing 
industry as well as undermine the diet of those living along the river, who attain over 70 
percent of their total protein from the Mekong.49 
Although the manufacturing sector employs only 15.5 percent of the workforce, 
exports account for more than half of Thailand’s GDP. 
Manufacturing 
50
                                                          
47 Yoolim Lee, "China hydropower dams in Mekong River give shocks to 60 million,” Bloomberg, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-26/china-hydropower-dams-in-mekong-river-give-shocks-to-60-
million.html (accessed January 05, 2011).  
 Many of Thailand’s major 
48 International Rivers & Environmental Defense, “An Analysis on Nam Theun 2 Compliance with World Commission 
on Dams Strategic Priorities,” Environmental Defense Fund, 
http://www.edf.org/documents/4400_NT2ExecSummary.pdf (accessed 8 May 2010).   
49 Ibid. 
50 The 2009 Labor Force Survey, National Statistical Office of Thailand, http://web.nso.go.th/en/survey/lfs/lfs2009.htm 
(accessed January 20, 2011).  
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export goods face volatile world demand, such as mechanical and electronic components, 
jewelry, and precious metals.51  World demand for these products declined severely 
during the 2008 global recession; most of Thailand’s export sectors experienced double-
digit drops, reaching 23.5 percent in the first half of 2009.52 The inability of the 
manufacturing sector to absorb people flooding in from the countryside to work at higher 
pay, or to provide enough demand for decently-paying service jobs, has led to an increase 
in urban poverty. With little to no formal education, nearly 58 percent of rural migrant 
workers earn less than minimum wage.53  
Thailand’s dependence on high-end tourism has been quite successful and 
accounts for 6–8 percent of the national GDP; thereby making it the largest contribution 
to a country’s economy than that of any other Asian nation.
Tourism 
54
Global economic downturns reduce tourism revenues, but so does perceived 
safety of travel. Thailand is at risk of geological instability that occurs rather rarely but 
accumulates huge financial and human loses. The wave that hit the Andaman coast on 26 
December 2004 left 5,395 dead, another 2,817 missing, and 8,457 injured.
  However, as an industry it 
is hypersensitive to economic, environmental, and political variables.  
55 This event 
negatively affected sixty thousand people and accrued 15 billion baht worth of damages; 
it also frightened tourists from visiting the country’s beaches for many months after.56
                                                          
51 The World Factbook: Thailand, Central Intelligence Agency, 
  
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/th.html (accessed January 20, 2011).  
52 Suwanee Khamman . "The impact of the global food, fuel, and financial crises and policy responses: a child-sensitive 
approach." National Economic and Social Development Board (Bangkok: Royal Thai Government, 2009).  
53 Somchai and Son,13. 
54 Sander and others, 3. 
55 Somchai and Son, 24-5.  
56 Ibid. 
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Over the last few years, fears have significantly diminished. Unfortunately, the tectonic 
plates which caused the 2004 mega tsunami are among the most active in the world.57
Thailand’s hostile political climate poses the greatest threat to its tourist industry 
as the nation becomes more unstable in the eyes of the world. The economic impact of 
the 2009 airport closure lasted for about two quarters beyond the resolution of the 
immediate crisis. While the political unrest in April and May of 2010 caused a large 
decline in number of foreign visitors as governments warned their citizens against 
coming to Thailand; resulting in a 50 percent drop in foreign arrivals to Bangkok’s 
Suvarnabhumi airport. The conflict was estimated to have caused GDP to contract by 
over 4 percent from the previous quarter.
 
The chances of an equally devastating event occurring in the near future are slim, yet not 
completely improbable.  
58 Future conflicts will undoubtedly reaffirm 
Thailand reputation as an increasingly unstable country.  
The World Bank’s June 2010 Thailand Economic Monitor report states that the 
2010 conflict’s impact on domestic demand will likely be significant as increased 
uncertainty leads to precautionary behavior in consumers and investors alike. The only 
sectors which are expected to be relatively unaffected by the crisis are manufacturing and 
logistics. However, they account for only 17 percent of the labor force; while sectors 
hardest hit i.e., retail and tourism, account for 23 percent of the labor force [Appendix 
4].
Consequences of Civil Unrest 
59
                                                          
57 Ibid.  
  
58 Sanders and others, 2. 
59 Ibid, 3.  
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The report stated that although the overall long-term impacts of the crisis are 
uncertain, resolving the political crisis is not only essential for the society’s well-being 
and cohesion, but also crucial for reaching economic growth targets and sustainability 
goals. Additionally, the constraints that have limited potential economic growth in the 
past will undoubtedly remain, and most likely be magnified by escalations in political 
insecurity.  
The report concluded that a solution to Thailand’s political conflict must be 
implemented. A perpetuating conflict will not only lead to the breakdown of confidence 
in foreign investors, but will also negatively affect human welfare. Subsequently, the 
income of many Thais will decline through job losses, shifts to lower wage jobs, or 
reduced work hours. This could lead to serious political consequences. Since the majority 
of the population remains without social protection, and past ad hoc attempts to provide 
social safety nets were not wholly successful—the already combustible situation would 
be aggravated further and popular support of the current government would 
correspondingly decrease.  
The Sources of Thailand’s Inequality and Poverty  
It does not take elaborate social theories to see something that is quite basic. In 
democracies, people participate in politics because they have something to gain. This is 
especially applicable to rural Thais [Appendix 5]. Accordingly, the Northeast and North 
scored highest on UNDP’s political and social participation indexes; while Bangkok and 
neighboring provinces ranked bottom.
Political Inequality 
60
                                                          
60 Baker, 16.  
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Struggling to make a living, these people have few connections and no financial 
resources, and therefore few opportunities to influence government policy. Their citizens’ 
strategy toolbox consists of two basic tools: election votes and street protests. In case 
their voting rights are effectively revoked, through government corruption and military 
meddling, such people are left virtually helpless. Feeling choked, instigators use street 
protests as a last resort to create public unrest and then choose to utilize this as leverage 
against a perceivably unresponsive government.  
Hence, it is easy to see the source of anger when we re-examine the Thai 
situation. In office, Thaksin advocated populist policies and implemented social welfare 
schemes directed at the poor, i.e., the universal health care scheme and one million baht 
per village. Suddenly ousting a prime minister, popular among the poor and less 
privileged—the majority of the population in Thailand’s case—, is hardly a recipe for 
social cohesion.  
Both the 1997 and 2007 Constitutions promised all Thais a right to participate in a 
democratic government; however, the system for political engagement has since fractured 
or else never been truly invoked. Although political party affiliation depends on many 
factors, in the case of Thailand, there is a clear regional and social divide between red 
shirts and yellow shirts. The yellow shirts, Thaksin’s critics, are concentrated in Bangkok 
and the surrounding area; the most affluent and urbanized region of the nation. The red 
shirts, Thaksin’s supporters, are from the northeast and upper northern regions. “They 
present themselves as rural and poor, as opposed to the urban elites who are closer to the 
revered King Bhumibol and his family.”61
                                                          
61 "Thailand's Riots: A Polity Imploding.”  
 As general rule, political alliance and 
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influence is determined by regional lines, which consequently match socioeconomic 
distributions [Appendix 6]. This coincidence is hard to overlook and leads to the question 
of national equity and distribution of wealth.  
Inequity problem have been hard to pinpoint, since overall economic gains mask 
the serious disparities existing between and within Asian countries. Consequentially, 
these inequalities can be traced to various dimensions of unevenness in the economies’ 
growth process. In a 2007 Asian Development Review, the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) assessed that, over the last decade, developing Asia’s rapid growth rates 
contributed to a remarkable decline in the incidence of poverty, yet have also been 
marked by rising income and expenditure inequalities.
Rapid Growth and Increases in Inequality 
62 Using the Gini coefficient, a 
standard measure of relative inequality, the ADB measured inequality in expenditure and 
income distributions of all ADB developing member countries. Seven countries had 
coefficients of 40 or more, three of which were in South East Asia, including Thailand 
[Appendix 7].63,64
                                                          
62 Ifzal Ali, "Inequality and the Imperative for Inclusive," Asian Development Review. Asian Development Bank, 
(2007), 1. 
 
63 Ibid, 3.  
64 It should be noted that this ADB report credited Thailand to be among the nations that was able to decrease its Gini 
coefficient between 1990s and 2000s [see Appendix 8]. However, the report cited an ADB working paper titled 
Inclusive Growth toward a prosperous Asia: Policy Implications published earlier that year. In this report the sources 
were listed as being the World Bank’s PovcalNet database, World Institute for Development Economic Research 
(WIID), among others [see Appendix 9].  Yet in a 2006 United Nations (UN) report titled Growth with Equity in East 
Asia?, the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) noted that “there is no evidence supporting the World 
Bank’s claim of a dramatic decline in income inequality in Thailand.” This claim was supported by using two different 
data sets from Thailand’s Chulalongkorn University i.e., 1962-1992 and 1962-1998 [see Appendix 10]. The tables 
clearly show that since data became available in the 1960s, Thailand’s Gini coefficient has been continuously rising 
and reached its peak in 1992 at 0.54. (Jomo, K.S.“Growth with Equity in East Asia?” Department of Economic and 
Social Affair (Kuala Lampur: United Nations, 2006), 11.) 
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Over a span of 40 years, inequality in Thailand has become worse; even when 
compared to other South East Asian nations the contrast is striking [see Appendix 11].65  
Additionally, social welfare spending as a percentage of GDP in Thailand has been 
consistently lower than in other East Asian countries.66 A number of neighboring nations 
were able to dampen the effects of rising levels of inequality by implementing initiatives 
to reduce poverty, e.g., South Korean and Taiwanese land reforms in the late 1940s. 67
Economic growth in high Gini coefficient Asian countries has been identified to 
be uneven across several dimensions: geographic sub-national locations (e.g., provinces, 
regions, or states); urban and rural sectors; and socioeconomic groups (e.g., education 
levels and sector work).
 On 
the other hand, the success rates of such policies varied by country.  
68 Thailand clearly follows this relationship. In 2004, 17 percent 
of Thailand’s population lived in the Bangkok area, yet Bangkokians accounted for 44 
percent of the total GDP.69 The remaining Central region had 17 percent of the 
population and 27 percent of GDP. 70  The South accounted for 14 percent of the 
population, while sharing 9 percent of national GDP; meanwhile the mountainous North 
had 18 percent of the population and only 9 percent of GDP. 71
Thailand’s agrarian regions showed the clearest disadvantage. Historically, the 
Northeast has always been one of Thailand’s poorest areas. Not only because of its 
unfavorable natural resource endowments i.e., low rainfall and poor soil, but also due to a 
lack of investment in productive and human capital. Therefore, it should not come as a 
  
                                                          
65 Baker, 23.  
66 Annette Dixon, “Financial and Social Protection in Thailand.” Workshop, World Bank, September 11, 2009.  
67 Jomo, 3-4. 
68 Ali, 6.  
69 Jomo, 13-4.  
70 Ibid.  
71 Ibid. 
22 
 
surprise that although the Isan region had the largest portion of the population in 2004 at 
34 percent, but enjoyed a mere 11 percent share of national output. 72
In the quest to make Thailand part of the global economy, policymakers focused 
government spending on industry while neglecting agriculture. The unevenness in growth 
arose from biased policies, which favored certain groups and regions over others. In the 
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s industrial promotion through trade protection and foreign 
investment allocated capital into manufacturing, banking, finance, insurance and real 
estate. These policies developed urban sectors at the expense of rural agriculture, largely 
restricting benefits to Bangkok and its vicinity.  
  
Consequentially, wage gaps between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors 
increased, while income levels between rural and urban populations also diverged. 
Consequently, impacts of past policies are still present.  As of 2009, the average wage of 
a female working in the non-agricultural sector (9,596 baht per month) was 3 times 
higher than a female worker in the agricultural sector (3,163.6 baht per month).73
In the past, temporary improvements in income distributions have been associated 
with favorable agricultural prices, suggesting that policies that enhance rural incomes 
could also improve the overall equity.
  
74 Deficiencies in public investments in agriculture 
and the rural economy overall, has been problematic precisely because the productivity of 
agriculture determines the standards of living for many people in Asia.75
                                                          
72 Ibid.  
 Less than fifty 
years ago, an overwhelming 82 percent of the Thai population worked in agriculture 
73 Labor Force Survey, National Statistical Office of Thailand.  
74 Jomo, 14. 
75Ali, 6-7. 
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compared to the current 42 percent.76 The share of GDP of the agricultural sector sharply 
declined from nearly 40 percent in 1960 to approximately 11 percent in the mid-1990s.77 
The employment rate in the agricultural declined less sharply. The largest proportion of 
the labor force is still employed in this sector, but enjoys proportionately less income 
than before. This effect has left more Thai people disadvantaged in the rural, rather than 
urban areas.  
A clear wage bias existed—and will always exist—in favor of skill; adoption of 
new technologies as well as foreign direct investments demand a more-skilled labor 
force. This is especially true with Thailand’s transition into a more service-based 
industry. However, this further contributes to income inequalities. Due to rapid economic 
growth, the demand for skilled workers has increased more rapidly than the demand for 
unskilled workers, resulting in faster growth of wages among the skilled.
Rises in Existing Income Disparities 
78
 In addition, past education policy has prioritized tertiary above secondary and 
primary education, helping the educated become even more educated. In 1986, 1990, and 
1994, households with incomes below the poverty line received very low shares (14–23 
 In other 
words, Thailand’s development increases wages among the group of workers who would 
have received better wages regardless of economic growth levels. This facilitates rises in 
existing income disparities. 
                                                          
76 Ibid.  
77 Isra Sarntisart, “Growth, Structural Change and Inequality: the experience of Thailand,” World Institute for 
Development Economics Research, Working Paper (Helsinki : United Nations University, 2000). 
78 Ali, 6-7. 
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percent) of the direct benefits of government education expenditure, compared to shares 
received by households above the poverty line (75–86 percent).79
Uneven access to education contributed to regional inequality. It partially explains 
why the average 2010 income of Bangkokians was 13 times that of Isan people, 
compared to only five times higher in 1987.
  
80 Unfortunately, even the most recent 
subsidies help the rich, while not helping the poor enough; resulting in a failure to breach 
the achievement gap between children of different socioeconomic backgrounds.  
Having their seeds sown in the 1970s, changes in Thai lifestyle, architecture, and 
behavior have became more visible in the early 1990s and onward. A new class of 
nouveaux riches has become socially identifiable.
Perceived Inequality 
81  It is this cosmopolitan modernity 
that Thailand’s film industry is presenting to its rural populations when it portrays the 
modern homes and lifestyles of urban professionals living in Bangkok. 82
 Although unfair distribution in health, education, public policy participation, and 
economic assets such as land are undoubtedly serious forms of inequity, the obvious 
differences in lifestyles are a more embittering form of inequality. Popular media provide 
 Many people 
strive to imitate the lifestyles they see on television. Yet to the lower classes, most of 
glamorized status symbols, such as eating at sushi restaurants, are financially 
inaccessible. Financial barriers serve as social exclusion instruments and fuel resentment, 
threatening Thailand’s traditionally community-oriented culture, to which many rural 
populations still closely adhere.  
                                                          
79 Jomo, 15. 
80 “Thailand needs more than a quick fix to inequality.” The Nation. June 4, 2010.  
81 Aihwa Ong and Donald Macon, Ungrounded Empires the Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism 
(New York: Routledge, 1997), 266–269.  
82 Ibid. 
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windows into the lives of privileged Bangkokians. It offers rural Thais an opportunity to 
compare their lives to that of the urban elite—this awareness contributes to a rise 
perceived inequality. 
 In an atmosphere where ostentation is not discouraged, the yawning gap between 
rich and poor is most openly displayed in Bangkok. There ostentatious displays of wealth 
are commonplace alongside the crushing poverty experienced by millions of workers 
who migrated from the countryside.83
The perceived arrogance of Thailand's rich towards the poor is well documented.  
In 2008, a traffic incident in Bangkok led to a direct confrontation between Thailand’s 
rich and poor; and managed to shine a spotlight on the nation’s class conflict. 
  
84
 The victim’s daughter was quoted saying, “Many parts of the Thai bureaucratic 
system favor rich people—if you are not one of them, you will always be left at the back 
of the queue.”
 During a 
heated argument with a bus operator, the enraged driver of a Mercedes Benz accelerated 
into a crowd of awaiting bus passengers, killing one. Blaming the incident on mental 
stress, the Mercedes Benz driver was released on bail and allowed to keep his license. 
Although the public was outraged, there was little anyone could do since the luxury car 
owner was the son of a wealthy businessman and the nephew of a powerful police officer. 
85
 
  Unfortunately, such unfair treatment of the poor has become a social 
norm; ostensibly impoverished Thais hold little value in the eyes of the government.  
 
                                                          
83 Jonathan Head,“Thailand's Wealthy Untouchables," BBC News. April 7, 2008.  
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
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Besides open class conflict, the persistence of inequality, can lead to other 
unfavorable outcomes. First, high levels of inequality lead to pressures to redistribute in 
ways that may disturb public peace. While the persistence of inequalities reinforces the 
capture of political, economic, and legal institutions by a minority elite who secure 
benefits of public policy, investment, and services in favor of themselves. Such actions 
cause political inequality which only aggravates the initial imbalanced distribution of 
opportunity and endowment.
What Lies Ahead 
86
Politicians now recognize that in order to resolve Thailand’s civil unrest, social 
welfare must become a national priority. To address grievances in Thai society, Prime 
Minister Vejjajiva declared five main objectives for reconciliation efforts [Appendix 1]:
 Ultimately, the call for redistribution and sharing political 
power can range from peaceful and prolonged street demonstrations to a violent civil war. 
It is in this current stage that Thailand has found itself—its future undetermined as of yet.  
87
1) To uphold the monarchy. 
  
2) To resolve fundamental problems of social injustice by undertaking 
systematic and structural reformation of the Thai welfare state 
3) To enable the media’s free and constructive operation. 
4) To investigate the violent incidents which occurred since the demonstrations 
began in March. 
5) To establish mutually acceptable political rules by setting up a mechanism 
that solicits views from all members of society. 
 
In accordance with the second point, which addresses problems of social and 
economic injustice at the national level, Prime Minister Vejjajiva recently announced that 
Thailand will aim to be a welfare state by 2017. However, the Truth and Reconciliation 
                                                          
86 Ali, 8–9. 
87 “Thailand Update.” Royal Thai Embassy, Washington, D.C. May 7, 2010. 
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Committee, responsible for designing resolution measures, has been unsuccessful so far, 
failing to provide measures that satisfy all involved parties.88
Window of Opportunity: Current Advantages of Implementing Cash Transfers  
  
At present, the Strategic Plan for the Promotion of Social Welfare in Thailand 
(2007-11) has no explicit reference to cash transfers used as means of increasing 
children’s education, health, and nutrition levels.
Social Welfare Aids Future Economic Growth 
89
 CCT programs are beneficial for government and public alike; such programs 
would immediately alleviate poverty by raising the consumption floor of poor 
households, while also cultivating popular support for governing bodies. This would 
reduce conflict and disruption brought about by public opposition, ultimately promoting 
support for other policy reforms. In the long-term, these social welfare schemes would 
reduce inequity through advances in socioeconomic mobility, while a focus on children’s 
well-being and education will provide substantial investment returns to the national 
economy in the future.   
 Although the country’s recent civil 
unrest has brought much discord to Thailand, it has also created a window of opportunity 
for initiating social welfare programs. These circumstances are especially advantageous 
for implementing CCTs as an instrument of reconciliation. 
 Improvements in education, and other forms of human capital investment, have 
been identified as key in optimizing the nation’s economic potential. As education 
becomes more broadly based and equally accessible to all, people with low incomes are 
                                                          
88 Horn, "A Year After Protests, Thai Elections Set."  
89 "Thailand," South Learning on Social Protection. 2011. http://south-south.ipc-undp.org/asia-pacific/item/338-
thailand (accessed March 04, 2011).  
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better able to seek out economic opportunities.90 According to new growth theories the 
accumulation of human capital via education facilitates economic growth by increasing 
labor productivity as well as promoting technological innovation and adaptation.91 In 
support, cross-country empirical studies found primary and secondary school enrollment 
rates positively correlated to economic growth and investment; in addition these studies 
established a negative link between education and fertility rates.92
 Thailand has tailored its preferred economic growth strategy accordingly. This 
was demonstrated at the Sustainable Growth, Regional Balance and Social Development 
for Poverty Reduction in Thailand 2006 Seminar. This seminar was attended by the 
World Bank, the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), the 
Ministries of Finance, Education, Social Development and Human Security, 
Environment, as well as representatives from private sectors, universities, and research 
institutes. At this seminar, experts agreed that the nation must focus on increasing human 
capital in order to ensure economic growth and prosperity in the coming years.  
  
Thailand is now at a point of development in which the past approach to promote 
economic growth, namely infusing capital without developing higher labor skills, will not 
suffice [Appendix 12]. 93
                                                          
90 Ifzal Ali and Juzhong Zhuang, "Inclusive Growth Toward a Prosperous Asia: Policy Implications." Economic and 
Research Department. Working Paper. Asian Development Review (Philippines: Asian Development Bank, 2007), 23. 
 The country’s future growth will depend on its ability to 
strengthen skills and education of the workforce. This matter is urgent for the nation to 
become a more efficient knowledge-based economy; considering that 58.2 percent of the 
91 Hyun H. Son, “Human Capital Development.” Asian Development Bank Economics Working Paper Series No. 225 
(October 2010), 10. 
92 Ibid. 
93 "NESDB, World Bank Discuss Thailand's Tenth Plan," Development in Partnership, The World Bank in Thailand, 
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current labor force has an elementary level education or lower, much progress remains to 
be made [Appendix 13].94
The poor quality of education and the shortages of industrial skills are problems 
that Thailand must tackle forcefully if it is to evolve into a knowledge economy on par 
with other leading East Asian economies.
   
95  
In recent years, Thailand’s government has identified improvements in education, 
and other forms human capital investment, as key in optimizing the economy’s overall 
growth potential. Since CCTs are social welfare schemes that focus on poverty 
alleviation as well as human capital investment, they can improve overall national 
economic growth potential. Such social safety nets will gain political support and 
financial backing more readily than traditional forms of poverty relief. Also the fact that 
beneficiaries of CCTs are primarily young children can perhaps reduce the reluctance of 
the non-poor to contribute to social-welfare programs. 
Using the Reform Wave as an Advantage 
In support of CCT programs, recent surveys among the general public indicate 
that people prefer the government to take more responsibility for social welfare 
programs.96
                                                          
94 Labor Force Survey, National Statistical Office, 2008. 
 According to a survey conducted by Thailand Development Research 
Institute (TDRI) in May 2010, the six benefits most wanted by Thais are more education 
subsidies, free or low medical bills, vocational training assistance, pension plans, 
95 Piriya Pholphirul. World Bank Human Development Economist. e-mail message to author, January 5, 2011.  
96 Wichit Chaitrong,“Put more on Tax Roll: TDRI,” Bangkok Post, November 30, 2009.  
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unemployment assistance and increased funding for the underprivileged.97
As a solution, CCTs reduce corruption risks by establishing direct links between 
poor families and government aid; making social welfare more discreet and direct as well 
as independent of village authority. Having families handle program transfers on 
individual bases would also defuse some possible conflicts between beneficiaries and 
non-beneficiaries within Thailand’s close-knit village communities. One potential design 
could include provisions for privacy by which the amount each family receives would be 
private information, thereby eliminating arguments over benefit distribution. Overall, 
CCTs would enhance the efficiency of the social welfare mechanism in Thailand; with it 
improving the confidence in social safety nets as well as generating the willingness to 
fund them.  
 However, the 
report also uncovered a general distrust of the government’s ability to distribute benefits 
fairly. Especially worrisome is the biased poverty targeting at the village level. Village 
heads often allocate medical cards and other benefits according to their own criteria, 
prioritizing access to government aid for close relatives and friends.  
Conveniently, CCT programs also avoid the mistake of breeding dependence on 
the state and can potentially lift morale among the disadvantaged. In contrast to past 
policies, eligible beneficiaries in CCT programs enter into a form of social contract with 
the Thai government. A household’s cash transfers are directly linked to their choice of 
whether or not to proactively follow CCT rules. This form of social welfare scheme 
prohibits apathetic households from receiving cash transfers and avoids the problem of 
                                                          
97 Respondents live in 14 provinces across Thailand, 50 people from different educational backgrounds and jobs were 
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passive state dependence. Essentially, program benefits could cease after the household’s 
school-age children reached adulthood. For example, in neighboring Indonesia, the 
maximum duration of a family’s dependence was found to be an average of 6 years. 98,99
Additionally, such social welfare designs allow the poor to not only contribute to 
society, but become an integral part of building the nation’s future. Parents forgo having 
children work on the farm, and instead choose to assist the state in developing the next 
generation into an educated and more productive workforce.  
 
CCTs also allow Thailand to progress in its observance of universal human rights, 
especially emphasizing the importance of non-selectivity in accepting norms. The 
nation’s commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights during a 1993 
regional meeting for the World Conference demonstrated its desire to promote such 
principles. CCT effectively allow Thailand to actively abide to Articles 25 and 26, which 
state the right to adequate living and the right to education [Appendix 14].100
Additionally, a Thai CCT program will better align the nation with the United 
Nation’s Millennium Development Goals that it has agreed to achieve by 2015 
[Appendix 15]. The goals include eradicating poverty and hunger, achieving universal 
education, and reducing malnutrition, among others.
  
101
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(accessed March 25, 2011).  
101 Millennium Development Goals, United Nations, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ (accessed on March 25, 
2011). 
 
32 
 
The Thai government now recognizes that its services and expenditures targeted 
to the poorest households are weak. In this window of opportunity it is important to 
utilize the current momentum of policy reform and wave of social welfare expansion. 
Acting quickly to design country appropriate CCTs is likely to increase collaboration 
between Thailand’s other social welfare programs [Appendix 16].  
Resolving Current Social Welfare Flaws 
Also CCTs have the unique ability to resolve pitfalls of existing social welfare 
programs in Thailand, such as its free public schooling program. Despite having made 
graduation from secondary school mandatory by law, a large participation drop 
(approximately 30 percent) occurs immediately before admission into upper secondary 
education, i.e., 10th grade [Appendix 17].102
This trend can be partially explained by additional costs incurred to families with 
school-age children. Transportation costs to secondary schools, which are usually fewer, 
than primary schools and therefore located farther from villages, are too high for many 
impoverished households. Books are only provided free of cost if they are returned in 
good condition at the end of each school year; and although the government pays for one 
school uniform per child per year, families are responsible for providing all additional 
 Although this government welfare ostensibly 
provides 15 years of free education in public schools, the funds do not subsidize, and 
therefore motivate, poor households enough to encourage upper levels of education 
attainment.  
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school uniforms.103 Lastly, no barriers exist for more well-off families from receiving the 
benefits just mentioned. This aspect makes the current free schooling program less cost-
efficient. In contrast, CCTs are administered only to families with children meeting 
certain criteria. Barriers to aid access are built-in; increasing cost-effectiveness and 
accelerating achievement gap narrowing between children of all socioeconomic 
backgrounds.  
Thailand will also find CCT programs particularly favorable due to their focus on 
childhood development.  A growing trend in the North and Northeast is family 
breakdown.
Stopping the Deterioration in Childhood Development 
104 This is a major factor that inhibits childhood development in Thailand’s 
low-income families. As parents move from farm to city in search of higher wages, 
grandparents are left in rural villages to care for their grandchildren. However, for the 
learning process, particularly intellectual aspects, the grandparents cannot support the 
children as well as parents can. A 2009 study by Mahidol University found that pre-
school and school-aged children with parents as the major caregivers received better 
general health care and promotion of emotional, social, and intellectual development, 
while children with grandparents as their primary caregivers were twice as likely to suffer 
from delayed development. 105
A TDRI panel declared that absentee parents, gaps in economic conditions, and 
educational opportunities hinder the development of Thai democracy, and directly 
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contribute to Thailand’s current political conflict.106  Public support for childhood 
development is an essential precursor to maximizing benefits attained from education; 
since a healthy childhood leads to healthy, skilled adulthood, which in turn creates a 
healthy and productive society.107  
Further contributing to their efficiency potential, CCTs successfully hedge against 
unforeseen hazards while also eliminating demand for event-specific coping mechanisms. 
The risk management potentials are seen on household and national levels alike. First, the 
supplementary income serves as informal insurance against unexpected family 
emergencies such as unemployment and illness. Second, cash transfers reduce large-scale 
civilian vulnerability to global market shocks e.g., fuel or food price rises. In essence, 
providing protection against drastic consumption declines to members at the bottom of 
the ‘market chain’. Since Thailand’s economy is especially susceptible to outside shocks, 
CCTs can play an important role in minimizing financial vulnerability in times of 
economic volatility. This will avoid the increase in poverty incidents documented with 
past economic crises.  
CCTs as Buffers to Economic Volatility 
Thais have little to no culture of saving; the negative effects of this are most 
destabilizing in low income families. By creating an income buffer, a Thai CCT program 
would ease beneficiaries’ vulnerability when their household income levels suddenly 
drop. CCTs also encourage greater self-reliance through savings of monthly cash 
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transfers, instead of relying on erratic government schemes during periods of national 
economic downturn.  
CCTs may also provide some added benefit in ways of decreasing illegal activity 
and child labor. During times of increased economic stress, unemployed youth would be 
less likely to support household income by engaging in drug trafficking and prostitution; 
while parents would be less inclined to have their school-age children work.108  
Most CCT programs transfer cash allotments to the mother of the household, 
under the premise that it will be spent on the welfare of the family. Typically, a mother’s 
objectives are more closely aligned to those of her children.
Gender Equality and CCT Mechanisms 
109 In support, a study 
associated with Thammasat University found that female headed households in Thailand 
are generally better off than those headed by males. This suggests that women are more 
resourceful than men in handling household income.110
A combination of culture as well as promotion of gender equality from the early 
stages of development has allowed the status of women in Thailand to be relatively equal 
to that of men.
 
111 Both sexes enjoy equal schooling and participation in the labor market.  
Furthermore, Thai women enjoy a great deal of autonomy in decision making and 
managing of household budget.112
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 Considering preexisting norms, Thai women will 
easily manage cash transfer allotment. 
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Compared to other developing countries, Thailand allows a great deal of freedom 
to its women. Nonetheless, the nation stands to make further improvements in female 
empowerment. At present, women and children remain the main victims of violence as 
well as poverty. Shockingly, a 2004 UNDP study reported that nearly half of the Thai 
female population has been victim of sexual or physical violence inflicted upon them by 
their domestic partner.113 Additionally, prostitution and child trafficking remain 
prominent features in Thai society due to a thriving sex tourism industry. Under 
circumstances of domestic abuse and poverty, additional money from CCTs could 
undoubtedly secure a better future for Thailand’s women as well as children.  
The overall advantage of hindsight can be a practical guiding tool in developing a 
Thai CCT program appropriate in size and scope. The availability of assessment literature 
on foreign programs will undoubtedly expedite Thailand’s own design process. Utilizing 
pros and cons of past CCT programs will help Thailand avoid common implementation 
mistakes. CCT programs conducted in neighboring nations, i.e., Indonesia, Cambodia, 
and the Philippines, can offer useful insight into design and practice.  
Applying Lessons from Past CCT Programs 
For example, lessons from Cambodia’s Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction (JFPR) 
can be used to address Thailand’s 30 percent school enrolment drop after lower 
secondary education.114  JFPR encouraged Cambodian girls to continue into lower-
secondary school after completing elementary level education; evidence suggests that the 
program had an approximate 31 percentage point impact.115
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Sector Support Program (CESSP), a follow-up program targeting both boys and girls, 
proved nearly as successful with a 21 percentage point affect.116
Additionally, governments utilize feedback from domestic CCT experimentation. 
Through their design, pilot programs are used to address country specific challenges. In 
addition, small scale initiatives allow officials and social services to familiarize 
themselves with CCT mechanisms, effectively smoothing possible administrative kinks. 
Results are later analyzed and integrated into a larger social safety net development. The 
Brazilian government created a widely supported national program, Bolsa Familia, from 
aggregating lessons of smaller domestic initiatives.
     
117 
CCT sophistication largely depends on administration capacity. The most 
successful as well as advanced programs are currently found in middle-income Latin 
American countries. South American CCTs rely on effective administration via 
computerization and identity cards. In Brazil’s Bolsa Familia as well as Mexico’s 
Oportunidades program, computerized registries have improved targeting accuracy, 
allowing programs to be better than any previous social spending scheme in reaching the 
people they are intended to reach.
Benefits of Creating CCTs in Middle-Income Nations 
118
                                                          
116 Ibid. 
 For example, Bolsa Familia screens out non-
qualifying beneficiaries by checking beneficiary information against data on formal-
sector employees. While improving cost-effectiveness of social welfare spending, these 
practices also eliminate the reliance on community-led implementation and monitoring 
that many lower income CCT nations depend on.  
117 Kathy Lindert, “Brazil: Bolsa Familia Program-Scaling-up Cash Transfers for the Poor”, 71. 
118 “New Thinking about an old problem,” Poverty in Latin America, The Economist, September 15, 2005.  
 
38 
 
Thailand’s own status as a middle-income nation means it can utilize similar 
computerized mechanisms of currently successful CCT programs.  In addition, Thailand 
is sufficiently developed to absorb the future rise in demand for social services that will 
likely occur with a successfully implemented CCT program. To meet growing demand, 
the country could expand services more efficiently than its less developed, lower-income 
counterparts could.   
Potential Obstacles and Strategic Solutions: Designing with Foresight  
 
As previously discussed, Thailand has significant regional differences in poverty 
levels. The frequency of poverty is most pronounced in the northern, southern, and north-
eastern provinces. For example, the southern province of Narathiwat had 34 percent of its 
population living below poverty in 2002, compared to the national average of 9.8 
percent.
Quality and Distribution of Social Services: Strengthening Desirable Outcomes 
119
Similarly, economic regional disparities exist for education and health indicators. 
According to the UNDP,  Thais living in the North and Northeast suffer from 
disproportionate rates of underweight birth, disability, chronic health problems, AIDS, 
mental illness as well as the smallest ratio of physicians per capita [Appendix 18].
   
120 
Regional education levels are equally skewed. People from the Northeast, in addition to 
several northern and southern provinces, rank lowest in mean years of schooling, 
enrollment rates, test scores, and other indicators [Appendix 19].121
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 CCTs are not a panacea to all social ills; programs are largely effective, but 
challenges to goal accomplishment exist. Strong evidence from other programs shows 
that CCTs encourage poor households to make better use of health and education 
services. On the other hand, some controversy exists over the magnitude of improvement 
that CCTs alone can provide. By and large, the health and education impacts on 
beneficiaries can only be as good as the quality of social services that are provided.  
Foremost, in order to strengthen the impacts of cash transfers on Thailand’s 
overall human capital, the government must address the existing regional disparities in 
qualities of public services.  This could be accomplished by promoting greater supply as 
well as quality control of health facilities and schools in rural regions. Otherwise, the 
cash incentives responsible for promoting poverty reduction and human capital growth 
are rendered ineffective. 
 Supply-side progress must be made to address regional disparities in Thailand’s 
education and health service sectors. The most qualified professionals work in the 
Bangkok metropolis, while other areas of the country are badly in need of them. For 
example, there is one physician to every 850 people in Bangkok, compared to one for 
every 14,159 people in the northeastern province of Loei.
Quality and Distribution of Social Services: A Need for Improvement  
122
The poor quality of services in rural areas is perhaps most apparent in the 
education system. The NESB determined that 60 percent of Thai teachers underperform, 
especially those who work in poor rural schools.
   
123
                                                          
122 Somchai and Son, 41.  
 Rural teachers are often inadequate 
for a number of reasons. Although a large factor is that teachers themselves are often not 
123 Ibid., 14.  
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the best students; more incentives exist for Thailand’s brightest minds to become 
businessmen, lawyers, and government officials. Furthermore, many rural schools are 
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior instead of the Ministry of Education.124 
This association cuts rural teachers’ access to certain scholarships and other benefits, 
making rural employment especially unfavorable.125
Another disincentive against working in rural communities involves a somewhat 
mandatory adherence to traditional Thai culture.  In rural villages, teachers are given a 
special social status that is generally accompanied by a plunge into debt. In accordance 
with culture and tradition, teachers are expected to dress nicely, drive cars, as well as 
contribute large sums of money for family emergencies and community events. In order 
to adhere to a major cornerstone of Thai culture, many teachers are willing to incur large 
loans rather than “lose face.” 
  
 Nonetheless, a mediocre education is better than no education. The National 
Education Act stipulates that all persons have equal rights to receive 12 years of free 
schooling. However, only nine years are compulsory and parents are primarily 
responsible to enforce the law. Unfortunately, school attendance monitoring is often 
ineffective in poor households, since parents are away working most of the day. Reasons 
for children skipping school are numerous, and can be attributed to gang activity, 
gambling, drugs, etc. Admittedly, some children choose to forgo education for hopes of 
earning income to support their families. This is especially true among large families with 
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high dependency ratios i.e., households with larger numbers of children, old people, or 
disabled persons, compared to national averages.126
Although free tuition and uniforms do promote prolonged education, the 
unaccounted costs of transportation are often too great and the benefits too small, 
especially after the required nine years of schooling. This attitude is reinforced by 
established community-norms; children from poor backgrounds may not comprehend the 
long-term benefits of seeking an education above that of their elders. Subsequently, this 
behavior is translated into the one-third percentage drop in participation after lower 
secondary [Appendix 13].   
  
 
Quality and Distribution of Social Services: Recommendations  
CCTs directed towards education, require children attend 80–85 percent of all 
school days.127 This would provide additional incentives for parents to monitor school 
attendance; evaluations show that CCTs increased school enrollment in virtually every 
program. For example, Nicaragua’s Red de Protección Social (RPS) increased school 
enrollment by 13 percentage points among children aged 7–13; leading to substantial 
reductions in child labor.128
 In Thailand’s context, CCTs could be targeted to increase attendance rollover 
between lower and upper secondary schools. This has been done before in Mexico for 
children making the transition from primary to secondary school.
  
129
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 It is also important to 
note that school enrollment, in Oportunidades communities, also increased among 
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ineligible children. This phenomenon was largely attributed to the spillover effect; 
children from barely ineligible households were more likely to attend school, because 
their eligible peers were required by the program to attend regularly.130
Unfortunately, getting more children to attend school heavily depends on the 
quality of education offered.
 
131 In this aspect, some current education issues must be 
addressed. For one, incentives must be improved for highly capable individuals to 
become teachers. An increase in education budget and a subsequent rise in teaching 
salaries could provide enough incentive. At present, Thailand spends less than most 
lower-middle income nations on education. As a consequence, its average education 
levels need 28.7 years for convergence with those of currently industrialized nations, 
while those of neighboring Philippines and Indonesia require 10.6 and 20.7 years 
respectively [Appendix 20].132
In the past, Thailand has put considerable effort towards improving secondary 
education; however, evidence suggests earlier interventions targeted towards 
disadvantaged children may have higher returns than later interventions.
  
133 At age three, 
disadvantaged children may test only modestly behind national averages. However, by 
age six, children entering elementary school may be limited by inadequate levels of 
cognitive, social, and emotional development received in early childhood [Appendix 
21].134
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It would be worthwhile to consider a Thai CCT program aimed towards 
increasing kindergarten enrollment. At present, pre-education attendance is a quarter 
below that of elementary education [Appendix 22]. Foremost, increased enrollment in 
pre-school programs would improve basic development among young children. Those 
most vulnerable to delayed development i.e., children with grandparents as primary 
caregivers, would benefit substantially. Such programs would also be attractive in their 
cost-efficiency; generally speaking, kindergarten education is less burdensome to finance 
than secondary education, while the return in investments may be greater. 
Lastly, inputs in early education could enhance the formation of healthy livelong 
habits. In recent years, hospitals admissions for hypertension, heart disease, diabetes, and 
cancer have sharply increased [Appendix 23].135 The increase in such problems is largely 
driven by an unhealthy lifestyle i.e., more stress, insufficient exercise, unbalanced diet, 
and smoking and drinking habits.136 Against the background of rising health costs, 
preventative health care has recently gained greater importance.137
This could reduce potential future health care costs by structuring lesson plans 
around promoting a healthy lifestyle, including the benefits of exercise and proper 
nutrition as well as the dangers of smoking and drinking. This would especially benefit 
the poorest regions of the country, the Northeast, in which unhealthy habits are especially 
prevalent [Appendix 24].  
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The Universal Health Care (UHC) system was developed between 2001 and 2002. 
Five years later over 95 percent of the population had some form of health coverage; in 
2006, over 70 percent of hospital visits fell under the UHC gold card scheme, 
administered by the National Health Security Office (NHSO).
The Present State of Social Service Funding: Taking Care of Tax Payers 
138
Although the scheme is widely used and extremely popular, some policy issues do 
exist. For one, no effective barrier exists for middle and upper class citizens from 
accessing benefits. Temporarily unemployed formal sector employees can use the free 
health coverage for procedures not covered by the Social Security Fund (SSF).
 The impact of the health 
care reform provided informal sector workers, and their families, with free 
comprehensive health coverage.  
139
The universal healthcare scheme only delivers health services, whereas SSF 
provides a package of social services to formal sector employees, including maternity 
leave, child support, and old-age pension as well as assistance during injury, illness, 
unemployment, and disability.
 Formal 
sector employees are enrolled into the SSF plan and automatically excluded from NHSO 
health coverage. Therefore, the resources available to low-income families are stretched 
thin. 
140
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retirees, family members or direct employees of government or state enterprises. Nearly 1.4 million benefited from 
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 However, compared to NHSO dependants, SSF 
beneficiaries receive a smaller fraction of overall health care funds. Annually, public 
spending allocates 2,217 baht per person under the NHSO’s scheme, while spending 
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1,861 baht per person covered by SSF.141 Under the current system, taxpayers are 
perceivably receiving fewer health care benefits while fielding the insurance bill of 48 
million strangers.142
 This has two implications for CCTs. First, it inhibits taxpayer approval of health 
care services that the CCT initiative would require the poor to use. Second, it shows that 
the Thai government must use taxes more efficiently within existing social welfare 
programs.  
   
The feelings of reverse discrimination, currently brewing among the taxpayer 
population, must be ameliorated by guaranteeing equal per person public spending under 
SSF and NHSO coverage. This can be done if the government stopped diverting funds 
from civil service and social security schemes as a means to offset rising NHSO 
expenditure.
The Present State of Social Service Funding: A Need for Efficiency 
143
Universal health care schemes are inherently expensive ventures.  At present, 
Thailand is one of the only lower-middle income countries to have adopted a 
comprehensive UHC. Most programs are implemented in far more wealthy and 
developed European countries. The financial burdens of those UHC programs are not 
overwhelming to those governments since most utilize high income taxes for employees. 
The generated revenue allows governments to invest back into the system.  
   
On the other hand, the majority of Thailand’s population works in the informal 
sector and pays no income tax. To ensure UHC’s survival in today’s hostile economic 
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climate, the Thai government must operate the program more efficiently. In recent years, 
Thailand’s Public Health Ministry has increasingly become resource constrained.  The 
2008 global financial crisis led to a 3 percent decrease in government budget; by 2010, it 
ran 4.10 percent of the GDP as deficit.144  This economic downturn also contributed to a 
sharp increase in unemployment and a subsequent rise in free healthcare prescribers. In 
March 2009, it was reported that 50,000 people per month were turning to free UHC 
coverage as a result of the economic crisis.145
The increase in free healthcare users as well as a decrease in tax revenues was 
unfortunately timed. In 2007, the 30 baht per visit co-pay for gold card holders was 
abolished, dramatically reducing private expenditure for health services.
 
146
The increase in workload for doctors contributed to a migration of many 
physicians from the public health sector to the higher-paying private sector.
 In late 2010, 
280 state hospitals were experiencing financial problems as a result. To cover the rising 
costs of providing free universal healthcare, the Public Ministry of Health diverted funds 
away from formal sector insurance. As previously discussed, this led to a reduction in the 
annual baht-per-person expenditure for those covered by the SSF.  
147 This fuels 
an ongoing competition between Thailand’s public and private hospitals for attracting the 
best employees among the nation’s limited supply of qualified physicians.148
Despite high costs, the UHC is a necessary social welfare program in a nation that 
by and large provides no other social support to the majority of the population. The 
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importance of Thailand’s UHC has been recognized by red shirts and yellow shirts 
alike.149
A CCT initiative would provide much needed pressure to raise entry barriers 
within existing social welfare programs. For example, the universal healthcare scheme 
can become more cost-effective if underlying issues, such as free-rider problems, are 
adequately addressed. Admittedly, amending universal healthcare coverage might fuel 
dissatisfaction from the poor; however, if administered in tandem with a national CCT 
program, its backlash would be significantly less severe. A dual action plan would show 
that the government is not reducing the amount of support provided to low-income 
families, but is concerned about increasing UHC’s cost-effectiveness. This policy would 
also signal to taxpayers that the government is becoming more careful with public 
expenditure.  
  
A few hospitals among the many that were experiencing monetary constraints in 
late 2010, reportedly diverted hospital budgets to support community hospitals that were 
providing services to free healthcare dependants.
The Present State of Social Service Funding: Recommendations  
150
This is the case for Kambon Noi villagers, who live in a landfill community 
located on the outskirts of Khon Kaen. Kambon Noi’s nearest health center is a private 
 Especially in rural regions of the 
Thailand, community hospitals or clinics are more accessible than provincial hospitals. 
The cost of transportation as well as long hospital lines often deter impoverished Thais 
from seeking medical care in state hospitals.  
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clinic about 3–5 km from the village.151 Unless a situation is fairly serious, most landfill 
dwellers take out a 200 baht community loan to seek private healthcare care nearby; later 
repaying the money by working additional hours if such opportunities are available.152
Although all community members have gold cards, which entitle them to free 
health services at public hospitals, the Khon Kaen municipal hospital is located much 
farther from the village, approximately 17 km away. The cost of transportation and food 
alone can add up to nearly 300 baht in expenses; in addition to the opportunity costs of a 
lost workday.
  
153
It is not surprising that directors of some provincial hospitals have diverted their 
own funds to smaller community hospitals. These health centers are usually more 
accessible to majority of the rural poor. Unfortunately, Khambon Noi does not have a 
public community center nearby; villagers are willing to pay a premium for gaining 
access to nearby physicians.   
 Strangely, for Khambon Noi scavengers, accessing nearby private care is 
almost 100 baht cheaper than seeking free health services in the city. Also they avoid 
waiting long hours outside the hospital with hundreds of other patients.     
Ammar Siamwalla, an economist on NHSO’s finance and treasury subcommittee, 
suggests that financial problems can be solved by adopting a co-payment policy for 
patients under the civil service scheme, rather than re-instating the previous 30 baht fee 
of free health care beneficiaries.154 However, the civil service scheme covers a fraction of 
the people that the universal health care scheme covers.155
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 Khambon Noi’s example demonstrates that poor Thais are willing to pay much 
more than the once mandatory 30 baht co-payment to gain access to convenient health 
care, and that transportation costs to state hospitals too often exceed the out-of-pocket 
payments for receiving private medical service nearby.  
Therefore, a better solution to UHC’s financial problems would be to encourage 
voluntary donations from gold card members with a suggested amount of 30 baht per 
visit. This would bring at least some revenue to UHC on a volunteer basis. The resources 
could then be channeled into improving the quality and number of community hospitals 
available in rural areas.  
Recently, government health officials decided to add renal replacement therapy 
and antiretroviral therapy treatment to UHC’s extensive list of free procedures.156 By 
some estimates these items alone will account for 31.2 percent of health expenditure by 
2020.157
CCTs would be effective mechanisms in making this potential solution a reality. 
Cash transfers provide additional household income that could be used to invest back into 
the state healthcare system. Ideally, people would begin to contribute some money 
toward government initiatives for improving community hospital abundance.  
 Soliciting voluntary donations may be somewhat unpopular. However, it is a 
reasonable price to pay for alleviating the heavy strain the UHC is currently under. This 
is especially true considering that a substantial number of current UHC beneficiaries are 
not living below poverty lines.  
 In the long-run, this would cut transportation costs and waiting time among the 
rural poor; also reduce the dependence on more expensive nearby private clinics many 
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low-income families face. Likewise, a portion of the generated funds could be allocated 
for improvements in existing facilities through new medicine and medical equipment 
purchases as well as skill training programs.  
Pilot Programs 
On April 10th, 2010, red shirts rallied in Bangkok again, once more seeking 
justice for the unexplained civilian deaths during last year’s violent government 
crackdown. The yellow shirts have been holding protests of a different kind, pressuring 
the government to appoint a new administration rather than adhering to the current plan 
of holding national elections in June.  In response, Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva 
suggested postponing reelections until July.
Crucial First Steps to Reconciliation 
158
In a hostile environment, mistakes become more costly. The government cannot 
afford to engage a deeply fractured society in more political intrigue. The importance of 
holding free and fair elections is now amplified by domestic as well as international 
pressure.
 In light of such events, the International 
Crisis Group (ICG) released a grim report on Thailand’s political climate, urging the 
government to consider international third party reelection monitoring. 
159 A fair election race is crucial for gaining a proper national mandate to pursue 
genuine political reconciliation.160
The recipe for a fair victory is not complicated. The winner is likely to draw from 
a majority vote of the poor. In recent years, political participation has increased 
remarkably in rural regions. Overall improvements in political awareness, political 
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participation, and voting rates have been attributed to a strengthening in community 
organizations.161  The number of community groups per population are highest in the 
poorer regions of the country i.e., the Northeast, South, and North, while being lowest in 
the prosperous Bangkok metropolis [Appendix 25]. 162
 PAD politicians can no longer be in denial about the importance of the “rural” 
vote. Although Thaksin’s election victories were in part achieved by “bribing gullible 
rural voters,” it would be a foolish to believe that he alone utilized these election 
tactics.
 Much to the yellow shirts’ 
chagrin, these generally poorer, rural areas are also strongholds of their red shirted rivals.  
163
This strategy will be effective in the upcoming elections as well. Within the past 
year, the current government’s passive reconciliation attempts have deteriorated its 
credibility. The PAD is now in a position that demands that promises made to the public 
must become more tangible.  
 Thaksin was able to secure support, for his election and later reelection, by 
appealing to the masses through social welfare. Despite his other flaws, he generally 
delivered what he promised; each time his credibility strengthened in the eyes of the 
public.  
CCT pilot programs would be effective instruments in this regard. Beginning 
preparations for a series of social welfare pilot projects would surely appeal to the large 
segment of voters that red shirt supported parties usually draw from. It would prove to the 
nation’s poor that any political party with a sound social welfare platform can do just as 
much for Thailand as Puae Thai could.  
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 The beauty of a CCT design lies in its overall flexibility. While some 
governments use CCTs as the key components in poverty alleviation mechanisms, other 
nations conduct much smaller programs meant to fill in the gaps that existing social 
welfare leaves behind. The roles of CCT programs in national social policy differ country 
by country. Variations exist both in design as well as size. Even programs with similar 
goals still differ across nations by varying targeting systems, evaluations, payment 
mechanisms, etc. [Appendix 26].  
Design with Foresight 
As with many other cash transfer initiatives, an ideal approach for policymakers 
to determine appropriate CCT designs for Thailand is to launch a number of pilot projects 
with varying mechanisms and components.  This is an effective strategy to mitigate 
future risks and correctly adapt cash transfer programs into the nation’s social and 
economic context. Trial runs give policymakers sufficient time and insight for tailoring 
CCT programs to the strengths and weaknesses of their country. Furthermore, pilot 
programs allow local and national administrations to familiarize themselves with the 
CCT structure. Altogether these instruments are crucial for setting Thailand’s nationwide 
trajectories accurately. 
It would be especially beneficial for Thai policymakers to establish pilot 
programs in the Northeast. Pilot programs there would be especially strategic for two 
reasons. First, they would directly target the region with the greatest number of poor 
provinces [Appendix 27]. Second, such pilot programs would reduce anti-government 
influence in the red shirts’ support hub.  
Strategic Locations 
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Fortunately, there is a currently active program that can serve as precedent for 
such an initiative. Since its launch in 2007, Plan de Consolidación Integral de La 
Macarena’s (PCIM) carrot and stick approach has made significant impacts towards 
reducing insurgency as well as cocoa cultivation in Colombia’s eastern region of La 
Macarena, a traditional stronghold of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC).164 The program has led to significant improvements in infrastructure, including 
road expansion as well as introduction of computers to local schools. PCIM’s director, 
Alvaro Balcázar, believes that several strategic allocations of social programs and armed 
government forces are enough to bring about FARC’s total collapse.165
PCIM serves as a reminder that soft power counter-insurgency efforts are 
effective. Thailand’s civil unrest has not yet escalated to the same proportions as armed 
conflict in Colombia. However, the possibility of such events happening in Thailand’s 
future should not be underestimated. Appropriate soft-power measures could be 
undertaken to ameliorate national discontent in the immediate, potentially reducing the 
possibility as well as severity of future conflict.  
  
The most crucial objective is that support reaches the people its intended to reach. 
Most social welfare programs have some form of screening process that determines 
household eligibility. The accuracy of such mechanisms is especially important in nations 
that require cash transfer programs as channels for alleviating inequality. Several key 
factors affect CCT reliability, including: data collection processes, information 
Mechanisms 
                                                          
164 La Macarena has been a major support hub for the FARC symbolically as well as financially. The region’s narco-
trafficking activities have been a major generator of FARC funds. Coca plant leaves provide the raw ingredient in 
cocaine (Gary Leech, “The New Face of Plan Colombia: An ‘Alliance for Progress’ for the 21st Century?” London 
Progressive Journal, February 27, 2009).  
165 Ibid. 
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management, household assessment mechanisms, institutional arrangements, and 
monitoring mechanisms.166
There is no single recommended blueprint for household targeting systems. A 
large number of factors are involved in design and implementation of targeting 
systems.
 
167 Thailand can test several potential designs through pilot projects. However, 
most systems involve the same steps: collecting data on specific households via surveys, 
entering data into one household information registry, comparing household 
characteristics with pre-existing eligibility criteria, and establishing program-specific 
beneficiary lists for the purpose of oversight and payroll [Appendix 28].168
In Thailand’s context, proxy means testing (PMT) would be best. It is often used 
in nations with high degrees of labor market informality. PMT has been successful in 
several nations. Between 80–90 percent of benefits were received by the poorest 40 
percent of households in Chile as well as Mexico.
 The most 
basic objectives for policymakers is to maximize target accuracy and process 
transparency at reasonable administrative costs.  
169
Another crucial component of CCT program design is the type of process of 
beneficiary registration the government chooses. Two main forms of the registration 
process exist: 1) the on-demand application approach that relies on households to come to 
 In addition, combining PMT with 
other types of targeting has been proven to increase accuracy. Regional targeting can be 
used as a yardstick approach for prioritized registration. This could be done for a number 
of Thailand’s poorest northeastern provinces.  
                                                          
166 Castañeda and others. “Designing and Implementing Household Targeting Systems: Lessons from Latin American 
and the United States.”Social Protection Discussion Paper Series no. 0526. June 2005, v. 
167 Ibid., 3.  
168 Ibid., 2.  
169 Ibid.,5.  
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local welfare office to apply for benefits i.e., self-targeting approach; 2) the quasi-
exhaustive survey approach that involves interviewing all households in particular areas, 
thereby reducing the risks of missing potentially eligible households. Primarily, the 
decision between two approaches depends on the concentration of poverty, and the extent 
to which poverty is concentrated in particular areas [Appendix 29].  
Marginally the quasi-exhaustive approach is about 30 percent cheaper than the 
on-demand application method. On the other hand, the latter has an advantage of 
lowering overall program costs.170
Strong mechanism for monitoring and oversight will be essential as well, 
especially in regards to Thailand’s recent trends in decentralization. Overall error and 
benefit leakage can be decreased through methods such as interview oversight, automated 
checks against formal sector registries, and randomized quality control.
 Additionally, the on-demand method allows for a 
dynamic as well as ongoing registry. It provides opportunities for people to come in and 
out of the system. This aspect would be especially attractive to Thailand. Effectively, this 
would decrease the government’s reliance on ad hoc interventions during times of 
economic downturn. On other hand, random-sample spot checks would track unreported 
improvements in economic status and apply appropriate penalties, thereby improving 
overall cost-effectiveness of government CCT spending.  
171 In Brazil and 
Mexico computerized registries improved targeting practices and increased overall 
program efficiency.172
                                                          
170 The non-poor are unlikely to become eligible. Therefore, they would not waste their time to register.  
 
171 Ibid.  
172 ”New Thinking about an old problem” 
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Thailand’s own progress in data systems and research capacity as well as social 
welfare implementation and monitoring has allowed the nation to improve its national 
human welfare indicators.173
CCTs and the NSO can mutually benefit one another. CCTs can utilize available 
NSO data in a number of ways. For example, NSO information could be useful for 
identifying geographic priority areas. In addition, policymakers are able to use NSO’s 
socio-economic questionnaire as a guides to creating households surveys for proxy means 
testing. Country-specific samples provide officials vital insight for targeting operations. 
Most importantly, the NSO and other government departments provide CCT designers 
common characteristics of Thailand’s lower income population. This information can be 
used to establish eligibility criteria for the program through which household 
characteristics are compared to after unified registries are assembled [Appendix 30]. 
 Despite progress much remains to be done. Although the 
National Statistical Office (NSO) conducts socio-economic household surveys every two 
years, no comprehensive data system exists for the majority of Thailand’s poor i.e., 
informal sector workers and their dependants.  
CCT household registries have potential to assist the NSO as well since the 
unified household registry would include information on all CCT candidates regardless of 
their eligibility status. This would contribute to Thailand’s establishment of a unified 
national database for informal sector workers and their families. Ultimately, a 
computerized data system would facilitate the implementation and evaluation of other 
policies reforms, in addition to improving national welfare assessment accuracy.  
 
                                                          
173 Ministry of Public Health of Thailand, 31.  
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 Cost constraints are undoubtedly the largest obstacle that governments face in 
design, especially when demand exceeds available resources.
Determining Financial Commitments 
174
This inevitably raises questions over the financial feasibility of implementing 
CCT programs in Thailand. In order to determine program quotas, the government must 
allot a certain percent of the annual fiscal budget toward CCTs. 
 Many agencies compete 
for the limited resources of a government. Although cash transfer programs have 
incredible potential in increasing overall human welfare, it is important for policymakers 
to keep the price tag of such social welfare projects in mind.  
175
Variations exist both in design as well as size. Coverage can be as small as 1 
percent of the population i.e., Cambodia; or as large as 40 percent of the population in 
others countries.
 To do this, Thailand 
must find equitable ways of establishing such distribution quotas. Further, this question 
tackles the issue of size and scope. In this aspect, assessment of pilot programs once 
again can aid the government in establishing financial parameters for larger initiatives.  
176 Further, the sizes of cash transfers vary in generosity. Some benefits 
are as small as 1 percent of mean household consumption, while some programs, such as 
Mexico’s Oportunidades, generously provide up to 20 percent of mean household 
consumption.177
                                                          
174Castañeda and others, 12.  
  
175 Past assessments conducted by the World Bank suggest program quotas instead of registration quotas. Registration 
quotas are not recommended because they result in higher rates of exclusion since data is not compared to a nationwide 
registry. These quotas also decrease credibility and trust in the system, especially if field officers freely exercise their 
own discretion in determining eligibility criteria. Consequently, this could lead to bribery, lack of transparency, as well 
as a decrease in overall program effectiveness (Ibid). 
176 Fiszbein and others, 34.  
177 Ibid. 
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Despite impacts of the recent economic downturn, the Thai government is 
committed to continue its expansionary fiscal policy through 2011. In response to a UN 
questionnaire on public expenditure, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated that social 
expenditure on social welfare has significantly increased between 2008 and 2010.178
By early 2011, a limited amount of free transportation and utility provisions 
benefited the rural poor. Welfare initiatives such as free public transport and tap water 
were applicable primarily to urban areas.
  
179
More remains to be done. Presently, the poorest segment of the population lives 
on a day to day basis. For example, the percent of total expenditure to total income is 84 
percent in the Northeast compared to 68.5 percent in the Greater Bangkok area 
[Appendix 31].
 On the other hand, rural Thais did benefit 
from ostensibly free electricity provisions. At present, families are not charged for 
electricity if household consumption does not exceed a cost of 300 baht per month.  
180
 
 Accordingly, the highest household costs reported among the poor in 
Khon Kaen were for transportation and food. CCTs can have potential to significantly 
raise the consumption floor of impoverished by putting money into the hands of people 
that need it most.  
Calculations 
In order to gain a general understanding of cash transfer costs in Thailand, 
estimates are converted into household monthly quotas. Most recent NSO socio-
                                                          
178 “Thailand’s response to questionnaire on recent adjustment of public expenditure and the impact on those who live 
in poverty.” http://www.mfa.go.th/humanrights/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=107:thailands-
responses-to-questionnaire-on-recent-adjustment-of-public-expenditure-and-the-impact-on-those-who-live-in-
poverty&catid=35:un-resolution&Itemid=73 (accessed April 19, 2011). 
179 A number of “blue-labeled” free public buses could only be found in Bangkok. While the majority of the rural 
population relies on rain rather than tap water for consumption, since tap water is considered unsafe to drink.  
180 The 2008 Key Statistics of Thailand. National Statistical Office of Thailand  
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economic data defines the national poverty line at 1,443 baht per person per month.181 
Multiplying the stated income, the estimated monthly household budget of Thai families 
living at the national poverty line is 7,215 baht per month.182
As of 2007, 8.5 percent of the population i.e., 5.4 out of 63.9 million people, lived 
below the national poverty line. Allotting the poorest portion of the population into 
household units, 1.08 million households would be considered living in poverty. It is 
assumed that the program has 100 percent targeting efficiency. 
  
In order to get a rough estimate of program costs, assume that Thai cash transfer 
beneficiaries are given 5 percent of their monthly household consumption. This 
percentage falls well within the known cash transfer generosity range. Therefore, the 
average household’s cash transfer would be 360.75 baht per month, or 4,329 baht per 
year. All in all, cash transfer programs under this rough estimate amount to 
4,675,320,000 baht in annual expenditure. This amount is then adjusted to account for 
inflation from 2007 to 2011, making cash transfer allotment needs approximately 
5,130,228,636 baht.183
 The total government budget for the 2011 fiscal year is 1.12 trillion.
 
184
                                                          
181 Somchai and Son, 12. 
 Excluding 
administrative costs, cash transfer payments are a little over 0.2 percent of the 
government’s total budget allotment for the current year. Accordingly, cash transfer 
182 For the purpose of calculating cash transfer amounts it is reasonable to take the mean size of all households 
interviewed i.e., five individuals. This would also be consistent with Thailand’s household poverty trends. Specifically, 
poverty has been found to increase monotonically with household size, accounting for the larger proportion of 
dependents i.e., young children, the elderly, and the disabled (Kakwani and Krongkaew, 6).  
183 Bank of Thailand, “Thailand’s Macro Economic Indicators,” 
http://www2.bot.or.th/statistics/ReportPage.aspx?reportID=409&language=eng (accessed April 21, 2011). 
184 “Government Expenditure,” Information and Communication Technology Center, Ministry of Finance. 
http://dwfoc.mof.go.th/foc_eng/index.asp (accessed on April 21, 2011).  
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would use less than .74 percent of the 2011 government budget for undesignated 
commitments.  
During the initial phases of adoption, CCTs may have high administrative costs. 
In the beginning, a majority of resources are spent on targeting and monitoring 
mechanisms. Lowering costs through reductions in targeting and monitoring is not 
advised since these practices ultimately undermine the programs overall efficiency.   
Fortunately, monitoring and targeting becomes easier over time, leading to a 
reduction in administrative costs. For example, in 1997, targeting costs represented 65 
percent of Mexico’s total CCT administrative costs.185 By 2000, targeting costs fell to 11 
percent and the largest cost component were the actual transfers (41 percent).186
Conclusion: Holistic Solutions for Thailand 
 The 
initial costs are small to the overall benefit to society. Especially considering that there 
are now dozens of nations that have effective as well as cost-effective CCTs in progress. 
In recent years, there has been significant government effort towards enhancing 
the security of most vulnerable groups of Thai people. For example, free universal health 
care has improved the quality of life and security for a large portion of the population.187 
In addition, the informal sector pension plan, now under serious consideration, would 
represent another landmark development in social security.188
CCTs provide short- as well as long-term solution to issues of inequality and 
poverty, prevalent in developing capitalist societies. These new-generation social safety 
  Despite several 
accomplishments, much remains to be done for the state of human welfare in Thailand.  
                                                          
185 Son, Hyun H. “Conditional Cash Transfer Programs: An Effective Tool for Poverty Alleviation?” Asian 
Development Bank Economics and Research Department Policy Brief Series no. 51 (July 2008), 5.  
186 Ibid. 
187 Somchai and Son, iii. 
188 Ibid. 
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net mechanisms can vitally contribute to Thai society by addressing several key issues 
simultaneously. 
The immediate impacts of CCTs include alleviating household poverty by raising 
the consumption ceilings of poor families. Moreover the additional income provided by 
government aid also reduces income stress and facilitates a domestic environment more 
conducive to proper child development. Additionally, CCT implementation has great 
potential in improving relations between the government and public, thereby reducing 
social conflict and creating an environment promotive of other policy reforms.  
Ultimately, inter-generational transmission of poverty is reduced by elevating 
low-income youth to education, health, and nutrition levels of wealthier children via CCT 
incentives. CCT programs effectively even the “playing field” for young generations, 
leading to improvements in class mobility among impoverished socioeconomic groups.  
The positive correlation between human capital and economic growth has been 
established through numerous cross-country empirical studies; for example, primary and 
secondary school enrollment rates are positively linked with overall economic growth. 189
Old Siam has been plagued for years by poverty, social unrest, inequality, and 
economic uncertainty. Years of prosperity under capitalism have masked the ugly truth, 
   
At Thailand’s current stage of economic development, human capital investment must 
accompany infusion of capital. Currently, Thailand is not realizing its full human capital 
potential, leaving a large portion of the population poorly educated.  Through CCTs, the 
Thai government can engage the nation’s total human capital stock, thereby increasing 
returns in domestic investment.    
                                                          
189 Son (2010), 10. 
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while civil unrest and global economic downturn have recently exposed it. Thailand 
experiences precisely the combination of social ills which CCTs have been proven to 
ameliorate. Ultimately, the nation must engage a well-developed approach to solving the 
nation’s persisting problems. An appropriate CCT program can holistically address 
poverty alleviation and human capital investment, offering equal opportunity to all 
members of Thai society.  
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Appendix 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Royal Thai Embassy, Washington, D.C.  
 
 Source: Somchai and Son, 8.  
 
 
64 
 
Appendix 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
     Source: Somchai and Son, 58.  
 
 
Source: Sander and others, 3. 
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Appendix 5 
 The Human Achievement Index (HAI) is the first human development index at the provincial level 
that provides an overall assessment of Thailand’s human development. The participation index 
consists of four indicators: voter turnout, community groups, households participating in local 
groups, and household participating in social services. Provincial participation is ranked from 
highest to lowest i.e., green corresponds to highest participation levels, while red indicates lowest 
participation levels.  
Source: Somchai and Son, 138.  
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Appendix 6 
 
 
 
The Human Achievement Index (HAI) is the first human development index at the provincial level 
that provides an overall assessment of Thailand’s human development. The income index consists 
of four indicators: household income, poverty incidence, households with debt, and income 
disparity measured by the Gini coefficient. Provincial income is ranked from highest to lowest i.e., 
green correspond to highest income levels, while red indicates lowest income levels.  
         Source: Somchai and Son, 124.  
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Appendix 7 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ali, 3.  
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Appendix 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 9 
Source: Ali, 4.  
 
 
  Source: Ali, 3.  
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Appendix 10 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 11 
Source: Baker, 23.  
 
 
 Source: Jomo, 11.  
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Appendix 12 
 
 
Appendix 13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Son (2010), 14.  
 
 
  Source: Thailand Human Development Report, UNDP 2009, 14.  
 
 
Source: The 2008 Key Statistics of Thailand. National Statistical Office of Thailand. 
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Appendix 14 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
Article 24:  
Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working 
hours and periodic holidays with pay.  
 
Article 25:  
1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of 
himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing, and medical care and 
necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, 
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances 
beyond his control. 
 2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, 
whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Source: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
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Appendix 15 A 
Millennium Development Goals for Thailand 
 
 
 
Appendix 15 B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Source: Thailand Millennium Development Goals, 9.  
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Appendix 15 B 
Millennium Development Goals for Thailand Continued.  
  Source: Thailand Millennium Development Goals, 10.  
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Appendix 16 A 
 
Source: Working Group to Prepare a National Report on Strengthening Policies on Social Safety 
Nets. Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, October 18, 2000. 
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Appendix 16 B 
 
Source: Ibid. 
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Appendix 16 C 
 
 
Source: Ibid. 
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Appendix 16 D 
 
Source: Ibid. 
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Appendix 17 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Somchai and Son, 14.  
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Appendix 18 
 
 
 
  Source: Baker, 88. 
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Appendix 19 
 
 
 
  Source: Baker, 90. 
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Appendix 20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 21 
 
 
 
 
  Source: Son ( 2010), 9.  
 
 
Source: Christina Paxson and Norbert Schady, “Cognitive Development among Young Children in Ecuador: The 
Roles of Wealth, Health, and Parenting.” Journal of Human Resources, 42-1 (2007), 49-84. 
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Appendix 22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Source: The 2008 Key Statistics of Thailand, National Statistical Office of Thailand. 
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Appendix 23 
 
 
 
Appendix 24 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  Source: The Cigarette Smoking and Alcoholic Drinking Behavior Survey 2004, 2007, National Statistical Office, 
Ministry of Information and Technology 
 
 
Source: Somchai and Son, 38. 
 
 
Source: The 2008 Key Statistics of Thailand, National Statistical Office of Thailand. 
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Appendix 24 A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 25 
 
Source: Baker, 16. 
 
 
Source: The 2008 Key Statistics of Thailand, National Statistical Office of Thailand. 
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Appendix 26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Fiszbein and others, 37.   
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Appendix 27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Over nearly 75 percent of the sub districts and over half of all villages and urban 
blocks in the Northeast showed poverty incident rates at least 50 percent in 
excess of national averages. 
 
Source: Somchai, Jitsuchon.“Small Area Estimation Poverty Map for Thailand.” Paper presented at the SMERU 
Research Institute and Ford Foundation International Seminar in Jakarta, December 1-2, 2004. 
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Appendix 28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Castañeda and others, 7.  
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Appendix 30 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: “Defining and Measuring poverty,” Poverty in Thailand, Office of the National Economic and Social 
Development Board, 10.  
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Appendix 31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The 2008 Key Statistics of Thailand. National Statistical Office of Thailand. 
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